FEEDBACK & COMMENTSCivil Wars in Africa: (eds.) Taisier M. Ali & Robert O. Matthews. Publisher: (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) ISBN 0-7735-1777-4
Roots & ResolutionIntroduction
The editors of this volume have, for some time now, been engaged in a study of the civil war that has plagued Sudan virtually since its independence in 1956. In this study of Sudan we explore the underlying and proximate causes of that war and trace the numerous attempts made to resolve it. Our particular interest lies in accounting for the repeated failure of both Sudanese and disinterested third parties to reach a peaceful solution to this conflict.
While Sudan's civil war has the distinction of being Africa's longest civil war, it clearly is not its only one. Since achieving independence the African continent has had a long history of civil wars. Beginning with the Sudan in 1956, Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire) in 1960 and Nigeria in 1967, and ending with the most recent, though probably not the last, in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, these wars have reeked untold havoc on the lives of Africans, destroying their economies, dissolving their political institutions, and undermining the fabric of their societies.
Our underlying purpose here is to examine a number of these civil wars in a comparative context. Although not an exhaustive study of Africa's civil wars, this volume, unlike most earlier research on the same theme, does not limit itself to a single or several cases. Instead it focuses on seven instances of civil war and two instances in which civil war was averted. By comparing the root causes of these wars and the processes by which they have been resolved, if at all, we hope to see whether or not there are generalizations that we can make about the sources of conflict and the methods of conflict resolution. By examining two cases where the potential for large-scale civil strife existed but was avoided, we want to begin the task of identifying the policies most likely to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict and thus the conditions under which conflict can most successfully be managed.
Following a workshop during which we developed a common framework for this volume, the contributors were asked to address two general questions. First, what are the root causes of the civil war each is examining? While this will necessarily involve a description of the historical background, going back to the colonial period, we encouraged the authors to focus their analysis primarily on the post-independence years. The colonial legacy cannot be ignored, for colonial rule has helped to define and shape the societies from which have emerged civil wars, but it alone does not provide a sufficient explanation. Beyond the impact of colonialism, to what extent are the wars rooted in the socio-economic structures of post-colonial society, the result of such factors as ethnic/communal cleavages, ideological/political differences, disparities in economic wealth, intra-elite rivalries, general weakness in national societies, or environmental problems? Alternatively, the civil wars may be the consequence of the policies and practices of the ruling elite. According to this explanation, the civil wars emerge less from the long-term structural factors listed above than from the failure of governance, from the government's mismanagement of ethnic divisions, racial discord, religious differences, and regional economic disparities. While the first explanation directs attention to the cleavages that divide societies, the focus of this explanation rests on the governing elite, the policies they pursue, and their vision of the future.
Civil wars may result not only from the impact of domestic social forces and the failure of governance by local elite. They can also emerge from forces, events and activities originating outside the country, from the surrounding region or the world at large. Certainly most governments faced with internal challenges to their authority have not hesitated to assign blame for the problems they confront to foreign intervention and intrigue. Our interest then lies in assessing the extent to which external forces and actors have served as convenient scapegoats, allowing the governing elite to divert attention from their own mismanagement, or have contributed to the initiation of civil conflict. Obviously the relative importance of regional and global actors in initiating civil strife will vary from case to case, though it is our contention that most civil wars in Africa are derived largely from internal sources.
Second, ultimately our interest lies in the resolution of these wars. Our concern thus is with an examination of the efforts made both by the parties themselves and by disinterested third parties to curb, dampen and hopefully resolve them. Are most civil conflicts brought under control by the parties themselves, either through the military victory of one side over the other or through negotiated settlements? What role, if any, do third parties play? On occasion, they act in such a manner as to prolong conflict, by identifying with and supporting one side or the other in the war. At other times, they intervene to promote a peaceful solution. When, how frequently and under what conditions have third parties played an active part in initiating reconciliation between the warring parties? In this context, we want to examine whether the end of the Cold War has had a salutary or baleful influence on the management of conflicts in Africa. In effect, do our cases confirm the view that the end of Soviet-American rivalry in Africa has created an environment more conducive to a peaceful settlement than towards a military solution or, alternatively, do they substantiate the contrary contention that with the decline of interest on the part of the two superpowers, internal conflicts that previously were contained are now likely to erupt?
Not only are we interested in exploring the kinds of actions taken by domestic leaders and third parties to end the fighting, but we are anxious to examine how the bases of a permanent peace can be nurtured. It is generally acknowledged that peace is not just the absence of war. If the structures of peace are not well established and even strengthened, civil unrest is likely to smoulder and erupt into violence again. The collapse of the Addis Ababa accord in 1983, which brought an end to eleven years of relative nonviolence in southern Sudan, illustrates that peace is easily reversible if the underlying causes of the conflict are not seriously addressed. Therefore, in those cases where the military struggle has largely wound down, as in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda, the principal focus will of necessity be on the difficult stage of transition from war to enduring peace. There is clearly a close parallel between the peace-building initiatives undertaken by the governments of these three countries and the policies pursued by Tanzania and Zimbabwe to prevent the outbreak of civil war in the first place. As we shall see, peace-building and war-prevention involve similar, if not identical activities.
Unfortunately, there are several instances in which wars have persisted over a considerable period of time; neither side is able to win militarily and negotiations are all but ruled out. In some such instances, one or both of the parties may proclaim their interest in talking with the other party but make it quite clear through their actions that they have no intent to negotiate in good faith. In either case, the outcome is protracted conflict rather than conflict resolution. Our intention in such cases is to examine the impediments to a peaceful or even a forceful resolution of such wars. To what extent are these latter cases due to forces beyond the control of competing leaders, an explanation suggested in the phrase "unripe for resolution", or to the myopia and ideological rigidity of one or both sides in the conflict?
In deciding what case studies to focus on in this volume, we were influenced by several factors. First, we were anxious to examine conflicts whose apparent roots vary and the processes by which they were resolved (if at all) differ. Second, we wanted to select cases in which third party involvement ranged across the spectrum from little or no participation to active engagement. Third, we chose countries that in all but one instance shared borders with at least one of the other countries under investigation here, thus drawing out the regional dimensions of internal conflict in Africa and showing how conflicts in adjacent countries actually feed on one another. Finally, we recognize that others have written about some of the cases we selected, but, as William Zartman points out, these studies “tend to be either historical or polemical.” We believe that our focus is neither purely historical nor polemical. In the end, we chose seven cases of civil war. Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and two instances involving potential rather than actual violent conflict: Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
In the first three chapters the civil wars examined are ones in which the main actors sought to achieve their ends chiefly by force. As John Kiyaga-Nsubuga demonstrates, Uganda's whole history since independence has been punctuated by civil war, until in 1986 the conflict was finally brought under control largely through military force without any noticeable assistance from outside. Although Tanzania did intervene militarily in the late 1970s, in the end, the Ugandans themselves have had to settle their own differences. Since coming to power Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement regime have engaged in the difficult task of transforming Uganda from a condition of continuous political instability and widespread violence to one of relative peace. Indeed, Kiyaga-Nsubuga devotes much of his chapter to the analysis of this peace-building in a society that has suffered extensive dislocation and to the tension that arises from opening up the political process to include a broad range of participants while needing at the same time to exercise political control. In the next chapter, John Prendergast and Mark Duffield highlight the experience of Ethiopia with a long civil war. Launched by Eritrea in response to the central government's violation of an earlier commitment to regional autonomy, the final defeat of Mengistu and the Derg and the subsequent secession of Eritrea were crafted on the battlefield rather than at the negotiating table. As in the case of Uganda, both Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia now face the momentous task of establishing the conditions of an enduring peace. Prendergast and Duffield describe how that process of peace-building has been adversely affected by the liberation experience and the special role that NGOs and donor countries have in that process. Finally, in his study of Rwanda, Bruce Jones offers another example of protracted conflict, ostensibly ethnic in nature. He outlines the various attempts at managing, if not resolving the conflict, a process that was facilitated by a number of African and European states and capped by the Arusha Accords in the summer of 1993. As in Liberia, this case included external intervention, on this occasion through the deployment of a United Nations monitoring force which regrettably was too small and without a proper mandate to prevent the collapse of the accords into a sustained period of genocide. In the end, the fighting was brought to a conclusion when the Rwandan Patriotic Front declared a military victory and a unilateral cease-fire.
The next two chapters focus on civil wars that have involved outside intervention to facilitate a negotiated end to bloody ethnic fighting that threatened to spill over into neighbouring territories. Elwood Dunn provides in his case study of Liberia an illustration of politically manipulated, ethnic differences resulting in sustained civil war. The states of West Africa (ECOWAS) intervened with a regional peace-keeping force to reduce the level of violence and to fashion a settlement. Divided in their support of Liberian rival factions, the regional force contributed itself to the delay in finding a final resolution, which still remains to be fully implemented. Indeed, as the last year has demonstrated, the Liberian conflict is not likely to end; with a measure of good luck and sustained external support, it may be better managed. In the next chapter John Saul draws attention to the peculiar mix of external and internal factors that explain the outbreak and continuation of the civil war in Mozambique. As in Liberia and Rwanda external actors, the most important of which were a lay Catholic Church organisation and the major Western donor countries, played an important part in bringing the parties together and helping them reach a political settlement in 1992. As part of that agreement a United Nations peace-keeping force was deployed to monitor the cease-fire, to provide humanitarian assistance, to oversee the demobilisation of Renamo's military forces and their integration into a new national army, and to ensure that national elections were free and fair. Saul describes in detail the implementation of the peace accord and the role of Western powers in that process.
In the last two cases of civil strife, the wars have dragged on with no apparent end in sight. In Somalia, as Hussein Adam vividly describes, the world witnessed the collapse of an authoritarian regime, which led to inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry on a national scale. The resulting civil war prompted international intervention to ensure the provision of relief and to assist in the promotion of a negotiated settlement. The United Nations has now withdrawn, having brought relief to the Somalis, but with the prospect of peace as distant as ever. Lastly, in their study of Sudan the two editors provide a case of protracted conflict over 40 years. Often portrayed as pitting an Arab, Islamic North against an African, Christian South, the reality is far more complex. Various attempts have been made to resolve this war, including intervention by individuals, other states and regional organisations, and a settlement reached at Addis Ababa that lasted for 11 years, but until now none of those attempts have succeeded in establishing an extended peace.
Our eighth case study, focusing on Tanzania and Zimbabwe, involves two countries which largely avoided severe and sustained internal unrest without a primary reliance on repression. In both countries, however, the potential for such a calamity existed and continues to do so. Hevina Dashwood focuses on the timely initiatives undertaken by the leaders of Zimbabwe to maintain stability and social peace and thus avert the tragedy that has befallen so many other African states, while Cranford Pratt describes how Nyerere developed policies and institutions that enabled Tanzania to chart a course over 16 years that avoided the divisive force of ethnic, regional and religious factionalism and intra-elite rivalries, as well as the corrosive effects of corruption.
It is often argued that contestation between the superpowers over spheres of influence has contributed to the intensification of nearly all inter- as well as intra-state conflicts in Africa. Yet, the end of the cold war and of superpower rivalry does not seem to have enhanced the capacity of African states to deal effectively with internal conflicts. Indeed, there is a danger that most ongoing civil wars will be allowed to drag on as in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan. This is an ominous reality, for not only are these countries deprived of the stability that is necessary for economic, social or political development but they also suffer from the rapid destruction of the institutions of civil society. The Cairo meeting of OAU Heads of States in 1993 created "a mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts" as well as a fund for peace-keeping operations. In 1994, the 30th OAU summit meeting in Tunis issued "A Declaration on the Fundamental Principles of Relations between African States" which prohibited the arming, training or financing of armed groups. It may seem premature to assess the impact of these developments within the OAU and of similar ones in the UN system, but it is important to study the extent to which these measures can be effective in resolving conflicts and whether additional steps need to be taken. In the last chapter James Busumtwi-Sam undertakes to explore the changes that have taken place in the role of the OAU and the UN in resolving such wars and to assess the effectiveness of these new procedures.
In our conclusions we attempt to draw out the similarities and differences among these various civil wars. On the surface, all the countries examined in this volume seem to have inherited deep ethnic cleavages that ruling elite have not hesitated to manipulate and exploit in order to strengthen their hold on power. To what extent are these civil wars rooted in what might be termed instrumental ethnicity? Once the civil wars have erupted, foreign interests are usually only too ready to intervene at their own initiative or to respond favourably to requests for support from one of the parties. Have outside forces in fact played a spoiling role, exacerbating these civil wars and reducing the likelihood of their peaceful resolution? Or have they instead offered their services as conciliator or mediator in the search for a negotiated settlement? In what instances and under what conditions does third party intervention succeed? Finally, the signing of an agreement is not the end of the road towards peace, just a step in that direction. In those instances in which the violent conflict has largely ended, what steps have the newly formed governments undertaken to make the difficult transition from war to peace? Is there a difference in the set of problems that such new governments face if they come to power through the barrel of a gun rather than through a negotiated settlement? It is against the background of these questions that we will draw out the conclusions to this volume.
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